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ABSTRACT
Al-Mafrachi, Basheer Husham Ali. M.S.C.E., Department of Computer Science and
Engineering, Wright State University, 2017. Detection of DDoS Attacks against the SDN
Controller using Statistical Approaches.

In traditional networks, switches and routers are very expensive, complex, and
inflexible because forwarding and handling of packets are in the same device. However,
Software Defined Networking (SDN) makes networks design more flexible, cheaper, and
programmable because it separates the control plane from the data plane. SDN gives
administrators of networks more flexibility to handle the whole network by using one
device which is the controller. Unfortunately, SDN faces a lot of security problems that
may severely affect the network operations if not properly addressed.
Threat vectors may target main components of SDN such as the control plane, the
data plane, and/or the application. Threats may also target the communication among these
components. Among the threats that can cause significant damages include attacks on the
control plane and communication between the controller and other networks components
by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the controller or communication protocols.
Controllers of SDN and their communications may be subjected to different types
of attacks. DDoS attacks on the SDN controller can bring the network down. In this thesis,
we have studied various form of DDoS attacks against the controller of SDN. We
conducted a comparative study of a set of methods for detecting DDoS attacks on the SDN
controller and identifying compromised switch interfaces. These methods are sequential
iii

probability ratio test (SPRT), count-based detection (CD), percentage-based detection
(PD), and entropy-based detection (ED). We implemented the detection methods and
evaluated the performance of the methods using publicly available DARPA datasets.
Finally, we found that SPRT is the only one that has the highest accuracy and F score and
detect almost all DDoS attacks without producing false positive and false negative.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an overview of this thesis. We identify the problem to be
studied and the significance of this research. This chapter also explains the goals and
outline of this thesis.
1.1 Overview
In traditional networks, traffic flows are transferring through networking devices
such as routers and switches that are distributed around the world. Networking devices are
responsible to control and forward traffics. Although these traditional networks are
widespread and popular, they have several drawbacks. First, they do not provide flexibility
to researchers to do their experiments and add new features or protocols [1], [2]. Second,
traditional networks are not programmable, so they cannot accept new commands to
improve their functionality. Third, the cost of networking devices is very high because each
device contains both the control and data plane [3].
However, Software Defined Networking (SDN) fixes the problems of traditional
network. SDN is a programmable and virtualized network that helps researches to insert
their new ideas. SDN separates the control plane from the data plane. The control plane is
responsible for handling information whereas the data plane is responsible for forwarding
data. By using SDN, researchers can do their own experiment in network without
disturbing other people who depend on it. Multiple network devices can be managed and
configured by using single device which is the control plane [4]. This may lead to reduce
the time of recovery when errors happened. Finally, SDN is cheaper than traditional netwo-
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rks [3], [5].
Because the SDN infrastructure is more flexible, programmable, and simpler than
the traditional networks, it can be deployed in many different types of networks such as
private networks, enterprise networks, and wide area networks [6] . Unfortunattely, SDN
has many challenges that need to be addressed. Scalability, performance, and security are
some of the challenges that face SDN.
Cyber-attacks have become a dangerous weapon against famous companies, banks,
government units, and universities. These attacks may lead to destroy, steal, expose,
change, and gain important information. Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities and get
unauthorized access to servers or clients and do their malicious purposes. SDN has
problems and vulnerabilities that attract attackers to perform their malicious actions.
There are many kinds of threat vectors that have been determined in SDN [8].
Some of these threats target main components of SDN such as the control plane, the data
plane, or application. Other threats target communication among these components. The
most dangerous threat attacks the control plane component and the communication
between this component and others. These threats would be done by exploiting the
vulnerabilities or bugs that exist in the controller or communication protocols. Attackers
would be able to control the whole network if they can successfully attack the control plane.
Controllers of SDN and their communications are subjected to different types of
attacks. Spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, distributed denial of
service attack (DDoS), and elevation of privilege are all kinds of attacks that target the
SDN controller [2]. The most dangerous one is DDoS attacks because research shows that
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the controller is a vulnerable target of DDoS attacks such as [36], [1], [9], [6], [10], and
[11]. If the controller is brought down, the whole network will be stopped.
1.2 Motivation for Attackers
There are too many reasons that induce intruders to target the controller in the SDN.
First of all, the controller benefits in SDN as a processing logical unit. Attackers can
manage the whole network if they can take over controller [12]. Moreover, controllers are
not secure and robust [3]. Controllers such as Beacon, Floodlight, OpenDayligh, and POX
have several bugs that attract attackers. Allocation memory space and unexpected stopping
for application of controller are some examples [2], [13]. Finally, aggregation of traffic
flows toward the controller is another reason [12]. This increases the congestion between
controller and switches. It also increases the problem of the scalability in controller [14].
Therefore, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities and problems in the controller to do
their malicious activities.
1.3 Significance
Because of the advantages of SDN, company such as Yahoo, Google, Microsoft,
Version, and Deutsche Telekom established Open Networking Foundation (ONF) to
develop Openflow specifications and promote utilization of SDN. Other technology
companies are also part of this association such as Cisco, Juniper, Broadcom, Dell, IBM,
NEC, Riverbed Technology, HP, Broadcom, Citrix, Ciena, Netgear, Netgear, Force10, and
NTT [15].
Main component of SDN which is controller and communications between
controller and other components are still vulnerable to DDoS attacks. Much research has
been conducted to find solutions for security of SDN [2]. Open Networking Foundation
(ONF) also has created several security working group to handle SDN security concern
3

[3]. However, the work is still in its early stage, and much research highlighted many issues
that need to be fixed and addressed [16].
This thesis tries to increase the awareness of dangers of DDoS attacks against the
controller. It also helps researchers to make controller of SDN more secure. Finally, it also
attempts to detect DDoS attacks in its early stage and protect information of people.
1.4 Thesis Goal, Scope, and Outline
The controller of SDN has serious vulnerbilites that attract attackers to lanuch
DDoS attacks. The attacks lead to overload the controller with many packet-in messages
coming from switches interfaces. The main goal of this thesis is to studies and compares
number of statistical approaches for identification of Distributed of Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks that target controller of SDN and locating compromised switch interfaces.
The scope of this thesis is limited to using the datasets that are available in the
Lincoln Laboratory website [17]. These datasets were captured at 1998 and 1999 by the
group of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to evaluate computer
network intrusion detection systems.
This thesis is organized as follow. Chapter two presents the literature review of
SDN. Chapter three depicts the algorithms that are used for DDoS detection. Chapter four
gives results, discussion, and evaluation. Finally, chapter five presents the conclusion and
future work.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents differences between the traditional and SDN. It also shows
main architecture of the SDN. It explains threats faced the SDN in general and the
controller of the SDN in specific. Finally, it presents the DDoS attacks and
countermeasures in the last part.
2.1 Traditional Networks:
Network transport protocols and distributed control that carry out inside networking
devices are responsible for handling and forwarding data at the same time from one place
to another. The information transfer in the form of packets is expressed as series of digits
0 and 1 [2]. Although traditional networks are widely spread around the world, they are
very complex to be managed, and the model proposed in [18] proves that. The current
network has several disadvantages:
First, the traditional networks do not provide enough flexibility for the designers to
add new features such as protocols, applications, and security measures to improve the
current networks. Changing the traditional networks model is not possible in practice, and
it is very hard to complete if possible [1]. For example, the process of adding the IPv6
protocol instead of the IPv4 protocol to improve the traditional networks took more than
ten years, and it is still not completely finished [2].
Second, the traditional networks do not have the programmability capability. They
cannot accept new commands to improve their functionality. To make it even more
complicated, researches who tried to do experiments are not able to insert their new design
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in the network without disrupting other people who depend on it. Thus, new ideas went
untried and untested [19].
Third, the prices for networking devices such as routers and switches are very high
because each device contains both the control plane and the data plane. The cost for
deploying and managing the traditional networks also has increased recently for many
reasons. Administrators need to buy or rent real estate to place their devices. They also
need to recruit and pay for large number of highly skilled employees to provide services to
people around the world, where there is a clear increasing scarcity of human resources [3].
There are many reasons behind these disadvantages. First, the data plane that is
responsible for forwarding information and the control plane that is responsible for
handling data are built together inside each network device as shown in figure 2.1.a. In
other words, admins of networks need to configure and adjust each network device to
update the whole network. This prevents innovation and decreases flexibility [20].

Figure 2.1 Compare between traditional networks and SDN: (a) traditional networks,
(b) SDN [5].
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Second, many vendors invented different types of networking devices based on
their policies and rules. They designed their devices to be a closed software platform. In
other words, they prevented access from external interfaces to the control plane, and they
made the internal interfaces flexibility hidden and only specified for forwarding process.
The barrier of inserting new ideas increased due to this. They did that because they spent a
lot of time designing their devices by adding their protocols and algorithms. They are afraid
that new research brings down the whole networks if they made open software platform
[19].
2.2 Why SDN
Software Defined Networking (SDN) solves the problems that are mentioned
above. SDN is a programmable and virtualized network. It separates control plane that
takes care of handling information from the data plane that takes care of forwarding data
as shown in figure 2.1.b. This produces many positive outcomes:
First of all, administrators can now manage multiple network devices that have
different the data plane from a centralized control plane instead of configuring each device
individually [4]. The controller can allocate the bandwidth in the data plane [3]. The ability
to isolate the data plane from the control plane helps to evaluate, debug, and test new the
SDN design before deploying it on real network. This can be achieved by using virtual
environment such as Mininet. Mininet is an emulation that can execute multiple number of
controllers, switches, and hosts virtually in one single machine [21], [22].
Moreover, researchers can also simply change the current design and insert new
protocols based on fixed commands through software program [4]. They can control part
of network to run their experiments without disrupting other people who depend on it. They
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can isolate their flow from production flow and direct their research flow to find its way
through networking devices. This process is done by using open protocol that helps the
control plane to control different devices remotely. OpenFlow is one example of protocol
that can help the control plane to communicate with the data plane.

In this way,

administrators can insert their addressing model or security method, and they are also able
to replace IP infrastructure easily [19], [20]. This increases the innovation in network
design and breaks the fence of inserting new ideas.
Finally, SDN is much cheaper than the traditional networks for many reasons. First
of all, single centralized controller can install policies and configuration for multiple
networking devices while administrators need to configure each device individually in the
conventional networks. This lowers time of deploying and decreases management
expenses in SDN. It also fixes problem of increasing scarcity of human resources because
one person can manage many data planes through one controller. Moreover, SDN
decreases the recovery time from faults and increase error detection and determination.
Finally, it also lowers energy consumption such as energy needed for cooling and service
function [3], [5].
2.3 SDN Architecture
SDN consists of three main components which are application (application layer),
the control plane (control layer), and the data plane (infrastructure layer). Application
locates in the upper side, and it contains multiple application logic and Northbound
Interfaces (NBIs). The control plane exists in the middle, and it contains NBIs, the control
logic, and Control-Data-Plane-Interfaces (CDPIs). Finally, the data plane locates in the
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bottom of this design, and it contains multiple CDPIs and forwarding engines as illustrated
in figure 2.2.
The NBIs help application plane to communicate with the control plane.
Application send down their network requirements to the controller while the control plane
send up its desired network behavior, statistics, and events to provide application with
abstract view of the whole networks. However, the southbound interfaces or (CDPIs) help
network elements that exist in the infrastructure plane to communicate with the control
plane. The data plane transfers its statistics, reports, events, and notifications up to the
control plane. The control plane sends down its network requirements to the network
elements that exist in the data plane, and the data plane obeys rules of control plane [23].

Figure 2.2 SDN components with management [23]
In the right side of the design as shown in figure 2.2, management and admin
component is responsible for providing static tasks to all planes that include the control
plane, the data plane, and application. The services agreement and contracts (SLAs) will
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be configured in the last component which is application plane [23]. Finally, this design
also has several agents and coordinators that are spread in the data plane and control plane.
These agents and coordinators are responsible to set up the isolation and sharing
configuration between the data plane and control plane[7].
2.3.1 OpenFlow Switch
OpenFlow switch is an example about the data plane. This switch offers an open
protocol which is OpenFlow protocol that helps researchers to program the flow table that
exist in networking devices. Administrators can insert their new protocols and security
paradigm. They can also add their addressing method instead of the current IP protocol
model. They may simply separate their research flows from the production flows, so they
can get comfortably implement and test their new idea without disturbing other people.
Flow table, secure channel, and OpenFlow protocol are the three parts of OpenFlow switch
as shown in figure 2.3 [19], [24].

Figure 2.3 OpenFlow switch [19]
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This switch consists of three parts. These parts are flow table, secure channel, and
openFlow protocol. First of all, OpenFlow switch contains multiple flow tables, and each
flow table contains multiple flow entry. Each entry in the table contains three fields. First,
packet header is the first field that identifies each flow. The header contains some
information such as the ethernet source address, ethernet destination address, type of
ethernet, IP source address, IP destination address, TCP port number, and TCP port
number. The action is the second field that helps switch in handling the received flow’s
packets. Statistics is the third field that keeps information about packets such as number of
packets, number of bytes, and time since the last packet match flow. In addition, secure
channel is the other part of this switch. It helps instructions and packets to be send back
and forth between the controller and switch in a secure environment. Moreover, the last
part is OpenFlow protocol that offers an open and standard path for controller to
communicate with switch [19], [24].
There are three main types of actions that can be taken by this switch. The first
action forwards a flow to a given port to let packets reach their destination. This case is
applied when there are rules in flow table about how to handle a received flow. The second
action encapsulates and forwards only first packet of each flow to the controller through
secure channel. This happens when there is no saved action in flow table about how to
process that flow. The reason for encapsulating and forwarding only first packet of each
flow toward controller is to reduce the controller overhead or bottleneck [2]. In other case,
all packets within each flow send to the controller for processing [19]. After processing a
flow in the controller, response will be sent and saved in the corresponding flow entry. The
third action drops a flow. The reason for this action is to prevent attacks such as the DDoS
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attacks, or it could be to decrease fake broadcast traffic from end users [19]. Finally, these
actions or rules are installed by the controller in the data plane. These actions could be
installed proactively by the controller which means on its accord. In other hands, the
controller can choose to install these actions reactively based on notifications or reports
from switches if there are no matches between existing rules and incoming packets [25].
2.4 Key Challenges
The main components of SDN design have many challenges that need to be
addressed. The scalability, performance, and security are some of these challenges that face
the SDN. In this section, causes of each challenge that face one or more of SDN
components will be explained. Finally, few proposed solutions for these problems will also
be presented in this section.
2.4.1 Scalability
It is hard to define the scalability, and there is no fixed definition for it. Many
researches define it as the size of application parallelization for many different devices.
However, others define it as the size of network, processor, and/or system to process and
handle the increasing amount of load. In general, it is a characteristic that should be positive
and desired regarding a network, system, design, and so on [26], [27], [14]. In the SDN,
system can be called scalable if controller can stay efficient when administrators increase
number of switches.
There are many reasons for controller to be non-scalable. First of all, decoupling
the control plane from the data plane is one reason for increasing problem of scalability in
the SDN. This separation requires two points. One of them is that management of whole
networks may be achieved from remote centralized device which is the controller. The
other one is that switches are only responsible for forwarding flows. In this case, switches
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send messages to the controller to know rules about handling packets, and the controller
responses with instructions. This increases the overload between controller and switches
[14].
Furthermore, another reason for scalability problem in SDN increases the number
of hosts such as desktops and laptops and networking devices such as routers and switches
in the network. When many nodes are added in the network, number of events or flow
requests that need to be handled by controller would also increase. This makes the
controller as a bottleneck point especially when controller has limited computation
resources like memory and processor. For example, NOX controller can process 30K
request per second in the small networks [28]. On other hand, NOX cannot perform well
in the network that has many nodes such as large data centers [29], [30]. Controller
bottleneck also creates delay in the data plane programing because time needed to handle
flow is increased in the control plane. As a result, this decreases speed of whole networks
[14].
Finally, increasing the distance between the controller location and networking
devices is another reason for the scalability problem in SDN. When the distance is
increased, the flow setup time such as adding, deleting, or updating in switch flow table
may be increased. The flow setup can be measured by calculating the round time trip (RTT)
which is the time of processing packets between the switches and the controller. Whenever
RTT is high, the flow setup delay is high. This introduces congestion in the data plane and
the controller, and it also results in increasing delay in the whole network [14], [31], [3].
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2.4.2 Performance
The performance is the processing speed of devices in network such as switches,
routers, controllers, and hosts depending on response time (latency) and amount of data
that can be processed (throughput) [3]. There are many reasons to decrease the performance
in SDN. First of all, number of controllers in the network can lead to performance problem.
When there are more than one controller in the network, the response time of controller for
flow request may be decreased. This increases performance and vice versa [32]. The
location of controller has effect on performance as mentioned in previous section [31].
In addition, type of network processing technology has an impact on the
performance of the whole network. Multicore (CPUs/ GPPs) may achieve highest
flexibility, but it cannot achieve performance greater than 10 Gigabit per second [33]. NPU/
NFP is better than the multicore process because it provides throughput of approximately
over 100 Gigabit per second for each device. This improves the performance, but it
decreases the flexibility of networks. PLD/ FPGA can do a flow processing for over 200
Gigabit/s per device. This is used in network processing and telecommunication. It
increases the performance and deceases the flexibility. Application- specific standard
products (ASSPs) are the base for highest performance network. It is used to implement
Ethernet switching because it supports over 500 Gigabit/s switching. The main
disadvantage of this technology is that it lowers flexibility. Application- specific integrated
circuits (ASICs) are another type of flow processing unit. This processor built in Cisco,
Juniper, and Huawei system vendors. ASICs offers highest cost, benefit, and performance,
but it does not provide higher flexibility as shown in figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4 Network processing [3]
Therefore, hybrid approach is the perfect solution for the previous problems in
order to offer high flexibility and performance at the same time. For example, building
design that contains PLD, NPU/NFP, and CPU/GPP can produce hybrid programmable
platform [3]. Lookup performance has an impact on the performance. Packet switching
throughput can be improved up to 25% if commodity network interface cards are used in
Linux [34]. Improving hardware acceleration can lead to increase performance by 20%
[35]. Current implementation of OpenFlow switch leads to unacceptable performance, and
modification on OpenFlow protocol can increase the performance and reduce the overhead
[36], [37].
2.4.3 Security
Cyber-attacks have become a dangerous weapon against famous companies, banks,
government units, and universities. Malicious attack destroy, steal, expose, change, and
gain important information. Unfortunately, the SDN has problems and vulnerabilities that
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attract attackers to perform their malicious actions. In general, there are many threat vectors
that are determined in SDN. These threat vectors in SDN and problems in the OpenFlow
model will be presented in the next two sections.
2.4.3.1 Threat Vectors in SDN
According to [8], there are seven types of threats vectors that are identified in the
SDN as shown in the figure 2.5. Some of these threats are specific to the SDN while others
are popular in the traditional networks as shown in table 1. The first threat vector fakes or
forges traffic flows that transfer between switches. Defective machine or malicious devices
may be the main cause for that threat. Attackers can use this vector to launch Denial of
Services attacks (DoS) against networking devices such as switches. The second threat
vector attacks switch devices. The main cause of this attack is vulnerability in switches
devices. By exploiting this threat, attackers can send traffic flows to other switches to
wreak havoc in the network. They can also slow down packets movement in the network.

Figure 2.5 Main threat vectors of SDN architectures [8]
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The third threat vector attacks on the control plane communications. By exploiting
this threat, attackers can forge traffic flows and send many requests to the controller to
overload it. This generates the DDoS attacks toward controller. The main reason for this
attack is the weakness in TLS/SSL protocol [38]. The fourth vector attacks against the
control plane by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the controller. Attackers may bring down
the whole network if they can successful attack the control plane. The fifth threat is lack in
ability to establish a communication between management plane and controller. The third,
fourth, and fifth threat vectors are the most dangerous attacks because attackers can lunch
the DDoS attacks and bring down the whole system. These vectors are more specify to the
SDN as shown in table 1 [2], [8].
Threats

Specific to SDN?

Consequences in SDN

Vector 1
Vector 2
Vector 3
Vector 4
Vector 5
Vector 6
Vector 7

no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no

may lead to DoS attacks
the impact is potentially increased
communication with controller may be explored
attacking controller can shutdown whole network
deploying malicious application in controller
the impact is potentially augmented
difficulties of fast recovery when faults happen

Table 1 SDN Specific Versus Nonspecific Threats [2], [8]
The sixth threat vector attacks on administrative stations. Finally, the seventh threat
vector is due to lack of trusted resources of remediation and forensics. These help to
identify attacks and lead to fast, secure, and correct recovery [8].
2.4.3.2 STRIDE Model Applied to SDN
According to [2], STRIDE is based on spoofing, tampering, repudiation,
information disclosure, denial of service attacks, and elevation of privilege. The OpenFlow
networks are subjected to these types of attacks. Table 2 summarized these attacks based
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on security properties and examples. First of all, spoofing is a malicious practice in which
attackers can hide their identity and send fake packets or traffic flows based on victim
identity to receiver. The main reason for this attack is lack of appropriate verification and
authentication [39]. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing, ARP routing poisoning,
or ARP cashing poisoning is an example of spoofing technique. In the traditional networks,
attackers send their MAC address along with the IP address of victim to the switch in the
local network area (LAN). As a result, any traffic that have IP address of victim will be
directed to the machine of attackers. In this way, attackers may change traffic, intercept
data frame in the network, and stop flows traffic if they want. This process happens due to
lack of authentication to determine the verification of sender. This triggers many other
attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM), DoS, and session hijacking attacks [40]. In
SDN, the controller plays a role of forwarding packets functionality assuming that it has
information of MAC-IP mapping. The controller receives pairs of MAC address and IP
address of victim and forward them to targeted hosts or switches to store them in cash table
[41]. Finally, attackers can spoof controller address. This helps attackers to control the
whole network and install rules in the forwarding devices [2].
Attack
Spoofing

Security
Property
Authentication

Tampering

Integrity

Repudiation

Non-repudiation

Information
disclosure
DoS
Elevation of
privilege

Confidentiality
Availability
Authorization

Examples
Forged ARP, IP and Mac address spoofing, and
IPv6 router advertisement.
Rule installation, counter falsification, and
modification affecting networking devices.
Modification for source address forgery and rule
installation.
Side channel attacks to explore flow rule setup.
Flow requests to overload control plane.
Control plane take over exploiting
implementation flaws.
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Table 2: STRIDE attacks in OpenFlow networks [2]
In addition, tempering is another form of attack that target the OpenFlow network.
Attackers can intercept stored or transported data, and they can modify, change, remove
that information to serve their need. This attack compromises integrity because intruders
can do their actions without receiving alarms in all receivers. In SDN, intruders can
intercept and change OpenFlow controller communication, and they can overwrite the
controller rules [39]. Counter falsification is an example of this type of attack. Intruders try
to guess existed flow policy and then tamper packets to increase counter. This malicious
action increases billing for customer and takes nonoptimal decision by load balancing
algorithm [2].
Furthermore, repudiation is another type of attack in the SDN. Separating the
control plane from the data plane increases the probability to trace malicious nodes and
hidden communications [42]. However, attackers try to do malicious manipulation or
tempering that lead to change identification or authoring data in order to access the user to
wrong data. This is happened due to lack of monitoring capabilities and tracing of the
controller or networking devices in the SDN [39], [43].
Moreover, the OpenFlow network also faces an attack that is called information
disclosure. The goal of this attack is to collect information about system that is publicly
available such as path levels, response time, and version number. The main problem for
this attack is due to the lack of confidentiality that is responsible for preventing access to
certain information that open the door to expose sensitive information [39]. For example,
attackers can get information about network operation when rule flows setup is in place.
The controllers in the SDN install flow rules in switch in two different ways which are
either reactive or proactive. when the flow rules installation is reactive, this means that
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installation is based on notifications or reports from switches. Attackers can measure the
delay between first flow and the next one. This creates an attack called fingerprinting which
is the first step to create DoS attack [44]. However, when the flow rules installation is
proactive, attackers cannot easily guess the forwarding flow rules, but it is still possible
[25].
Finally, the SDN presents problem of elevation of privilege attacks. Attackers can
have legitimate privilege of administrators. By using this attack, attackers can do what
administrators do such as opening and changing files and/or even changing user account.
Finally, there are no perfect deployment or application to decide whether a certain design
is strong or not. For example, while large scale data centers have been installed by Google
[45], they ignored the issue of conflicting application using internal conflict resolution and
single application blocks [46], [39].
2.5 DDoS Attacks and Countermeasures
The SDN also faces the DoS and/or DDoS attacks. The DoS attacks happen when
compromised host targets single system by sending flood of unnecessary traffics. The main
goal of this attack is to decrease system availability and prevent legitimate users from
accessing available services. If attackers use many hosts instead of only one to target single
system which is the controller, this is called DDoS attacks. DDoS has harmful
consequences on the controller of the SDN. For example, businessmen who are offering
online services can loss large amount of money if attackers can carry out DDoS
successfully against these services [47].
In the normal case of the SDN, when users tried to communicate with each other
within network, they first send packets to their switch that is connected to them. These
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incoming new packets will search to find a match with information that are stored in switch
forwarding table. The reason for that is that each packet can know its destination. If there
are any match, packets follow rules that are associated with the match. For example,
dropping packets is one option if there is a match. Another option is forwarding packet to
its destination node. However, if there are no matching between packets and information
in switch forwarding table, then switch will forward these packets to controller in a form
of packet-in messages for processing and getting new flow rule. The communication
between switches and controller may be done by using OpenFlow protocol [24]. Controller
would decide whether to drop or forward packet to its destination. It is responsible for
handling new packets and sending new rules to switches [19].

Figure 2.6 DDoS attacks in SDN [12]
Considering the previous normal case in the SDN, attackers can lunch DDoS
attacks against the controller by following one of next two scenarios. First, attacker hosts
(let say A1 and A2) who are under one switch (let say sw1 that is explained in figure 2.6)
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may send large number of new low-rate packets to their switch. IP addresses for these new
packets may also be spoofed and may not existed in switch flow table rules. As a result,
switch may generate many packet-in toward controller to get response. This makes the link
between compromised switch and the controller (CSL1 in figure 2.6) under congestion and
overload the controller with many new packet-in requests.
The second scenario is that attackers under multiple switches for same controller
(let say A1 to A5) send many new spoofed IP packets to their switches. This makes links
between these switches and controller (CSL1, CSL2, and CSL3) are all congested. This
creates an attack that is called blind DDoS attacks as stated in [48] . It is very hard to detect
because attack load is divided among switches. Finally, both cases result in denying
legitimate requests and decrease system availability [12].
Finally, DDoS attacks against the controller have several characteristics that make
identification process very hard to be done by conventional detection methods. First of all,
there is not many benefits of performing detection process in the switches because switches
may not be able to detect this attack completely. The reason for that is attackers may be
distributed and located under different switches, so switches receive low traffics which
seem to be normal. In addition, the controllers are not able to decide whether they are
affected by the DDoS attacks or not according to number of receiving traffics only because
attacks could be achieved by benign traffics. Furthermore, traditional detection methods of
DDoS attacks such as ICMP flooding, TCP SYN flooding, and HTTP flooding require to
have specific characteristics. However, traffics features that are generated toward the
controller in the SDN network are different from these knowing flooding. This makes it
impossible for traditional techniques to detect the DDoS attacks against the controller in
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the SDN [6]. Therefore, this thesis focuses on finding a good detection method of DDoS
attacks.
DDoS is a difficult problem that needs a real solution due to the reasons that are
mentioned earlier. According to [12], the DDoS solutions can be classified to whether they
are intrinsic solutions which are focused on the SDN components and their functionality
elements or extrinsic solutions which are focused on network flows and their features.
These two main classifications can be also categorized to further classification. Intrinsic
solutions can be classified into scheduling-based and architectural-based. However,
extrinsic solutions can be categorized into statistical and machine learning based.
2.5.1 Intrinsic Solutions
According to [12], intrinsic solutions are these solutions that are focused on the
SDN components and their functionality elements. They can be divided to either
scheduling-based solutions or architectural-based solutions.
Scheduling-based solutions are one of the implementation to protect the controller
of the SDN. In [49], H, Shih-Wen et al proposed a solution based on using hash-based
mechanism that operates in the control plane to increase the scalability. Switches may
generate many packet-in messages toward the controller due to receiving malicious traffics
or legitimate traffics from hosts. This increases the congestion and makes the controller as
a bottleneck point. Scheduling-based solutions aim mainly to decrease the controller
overhead and increase the scalability and reliability. They also help to reduce the
transmission delay and failure in response in case of the congestion. These solutions are
based on using round-robin model that assigns incoming packets from switches to multiple
queues in the controller. The main disadvantage of these solutions is that they cannot

23

recognize the flash crowd, which is based on sending large number of legitimate flows,
from the DDoS attacks. This means they does not have a detection model for the DDoS
attacks [12].
Another solution based on scheduling was proposed in [50]. This solution was
based on providing different queues for each switch in controller to receive incoming
packets. This distributes the allocation of controller processing capacity among switches.
This helps to separate packets that are coming from infected switch and these from
uninfected switch. This makes the controller to work even if it is under DDoS attacks. This
was the main goal of this method because controller failures may stop the whole networks.
Although this method separates malicious flows from normal flows, it was not able to
distinguish DDoS attacks from flash crowd [12].
Architectural-based solutions are another way to protect the controller in the SDN
from DDoS attacks. First of all, C. Dharmendra et al in [51] proposed a solution to fix
security and load balancing in SDN. They proposed a model for decoupling application
monitoring and packet monitoring from each other. This method has two parts which are
main and secondary controller as shown in figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7 Proposed Controller Architecture in [51]
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The advantage of this division is that secondary controller can take control if there
are failures in the main controller. On other hands, authors did not explain the detection
phase. Their design did not differentiate malicious from legitimate flows and consider
DDoS attacks and flash crowd identically [12].
Wang proposed FloodGuard which is a defensive method against DDoS attacks.
FloodGuard has two modules to do its job. The first one called proactive flow rules analyzer
which is in the control plane. In this stage, flow rules were derived in runtime based on
dynamic application tracking and symbolic execution. The main reason for this module
was to keep SDN running under DDoS attacks. The second module named packet
migration which is responsible to cash flows in switches then sending them to the controller
by using round- robin scheduling and rate limit. The main reason for this module was to
prevent congestion and process flows during flood without dropping out legitimate flows
[52].
Finally, control messages and monitoring traffics that are going back and forth
between controller and switches may increase congestion. As a result, Z. Adel et al in [53]
proposed a solution which is an orchestrator-based architecture for enhancing networksecurity. This model separated controlling functionality from monitoring and put each one
in a module, and both of modules were controlled by an orchestrator. Some kinds of attacks
could be determined by getting access to some packets such as DDoS attacks, and this was
called low resolution attacks. However, other attacks could be resolved by getting access
to all packets in network such as ARP attack, and this was called high resolution attack.
Orchestrator entity decide which module should be enabled according to attack type to do
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detection with the help of orchestrator instructions. On other hands, this method did not
totally mitigate the attack, and packets attack can still be used in the system [12].
2.5.2 Extrinsic Solutions
Extrinsic solutions are these solutions that are focused on network flows and their
features. They can be divided to either statistical or machine learning based solutions [12].
2.5.2.1 Statistical Based Solutions
First of all, statistical-based solutions are another approach to protect the controller
of the SDN. In [10], D. Kotani proposed a method which is packet-in filtering mechanism
to detect the DDoS attacks against the controller. This method was based on recoding the
values of packet header by switches before sending packet-in values to the controller.
Switches then filter out packets that are less important than others or have the same values
of recorded one. However, this method was inactive if the values of new packets header
that were generated by attackers are different from the recorded one [6].
In [54], P. Andres et al proposed a method that was called FlowFence to protect
control plane based on statistical solutions. In their approach, switches monitor their
interfaces to determine whether there is congestion or not by measuring which interface
consuming large bandwidth. Then, switches notify the controller if they identify a
congestion for a specific link. Because the controller is responsible for assigning bandwidth
for links between controller and its switches, the controller limits flow transmission rate
for the congested interface to prevent starvation. They believed that their method is simple,
efficient, fast, and prevented congestion. However, their method cannot prevent attacks
completely, and it only limited the flow transmission rate [12].
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Figure 2.8 Avant- Guard Architecture [55]
In [55], Avant-Guard was proposed to detect the SYN flood which is one kind of
DDoS attacks against the controller in the SDN. This framework includes two modules
which are connection migration and actuating triggers as shown in figure 2.8. The first
module was responsible for classifying TCP/SYN packets requests. If requests were
identified as normal, they were directed to its destination. However, if they were identified
as malicious, actuating triggers module enables an event for the controller to install flow
rule in switch to decrease response time. The drawback of this approach was that it can
identify only one type of DDoS attacks which is SYN flood [12].
In addition, detection attack based on entropy variation is another way of statistical
approach to protect the controller against the DDoS attacks. There are few works which
use entropy-based solution. One of these was suggested by Rui et al in [56]. Their idea was
based on calculated entropy for destination IP address. If value of entropy is larger than
certain threshold, then there are no DDoS attacks. However, if value of entropy is lower
than the proposed threshold, then there are DDoS attacks. The drawback of this method is
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that it could not separate malicious from legitimate packets [12]. However, this method
helped to achieve disturbed anomaly detection in the SDN and decrease congestion against
the controller [56].
Moreover, Chen in [9] proposed another way which is SDNShield to protect the
SDN against DDoS attacks. This defense framework was specified for protecting the SDN
network edges and the controller. First of all, SDNShield builds attack mitigation units
(AMU) which are array of software switches at the SDN network edges. These units help
to prevent the congestion or bottleneck at the SDN network edges. In addition, AMU helps
to protect the controller by installing two filtering platforms. The first one is statistical
differentiation (SD) which is responsible for separating the benign flows from malicious
flows. The second filter is TCP connection verification which is responsible in doing indepth investigation for false positive of the first step. This helps to make sure that benign
flows were accepted.
Furthermore, another solution for DDoS attacks which was based on anomaly
prevention techniques named a multi-criteria-based DDoS-attack prevention was
introduced in [57]. In this method, switches send statistical parameters to the controller
such as quantity of packets for each flow, numbers of flows entries, and arrival time. The
controller in turn receives these parameters and detects the DDoS attacks by using fuzzy
inference system and hard decision thresholds. This method could not only detect attacks
flows but also drop them based on demands from the control plane.
Finally, a new idea was suggested in [58] which was combining of OpenFlow and
sFlow module to detect and mitigate a DDoS attacks on the SDN. Authors of this paper
exploited the OpenFlow and sFlow protocol features to detect malicious flows in real time.
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Their framework composed three components which were collector, anomaly detection,
and anomaly mitigation as shown in figure 2.9. First, they discovered that OpenFlow
approach increased communication between switches and the controller. This decreased

Figure 2.9 Architecture of DDoS Detection and Mitigation that Proposed in [58]
scalability and increased probability of the DDoS attacks against the control plane. Thus,
they used sFlow approach instead of OpenFlow approach to separate controller from data
collection process and decrease the data collected. Second, they used entropy-based
detection for separating malicious and normal flows in both OpenFlow approach and sFlow
approach. Third, using anomaly mitigation to block undesired attacks. This module had
several advantages. For example, the scalability was improved because they did not need
to collect large numbers of flows as in OpenFlow approach. Performance was increased
because CPU and memory flow cache usage were minimized. Finally, there were an
effective reduction in the communication between the controller and switches that
decreases the possibility of overloading the controller.
2.5.2.2 Machine Learning Based Solutions
Machine-learning-based-solutions are another approach to identify DDoS attacks
against the controller in the SDN. In these kinds of solutions, the defense mechanism that
was trained by feeding free attack flows (training) into machine learning algorithm can
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detect attack flows (testing) [12]. Kokila et al. suggested a method to detect DDoS attacks
against the controller by using support vector machine (SVM) classifier [59].
SVM is one type of large margin classifier and kind of machine learning. It is used
primarily to find the decision boundary or a model that separates points to two or more
groups. For example, let us assume that we have a dataset of training samples, and each
point of these samples is marked as belong to one or another group. SVM creates a model
to separate these current data by drawing a clear decision boundary or gap that is as wide
as possible. The data points that created this boundary are called the support vector points.
Then, this model categorizes new datasets on the same space according to which side of
the gap they fall [60].
There are several intuitions behind the SVM. First, the large margin classifier may
help decrease the errors in calculation. This improves the classification task because points
that are located near the decision boundary have uncertain classification decision. In other
words, the uncertainty in the classification decision may be decreased by making the
margin large enough. Second, as long as the margin is large enough, the model may have
little choices of where data fit. As a result, the memory capacity may be decreased, and this
increases the ability to correctly classify data [60]. For these reasons, authors in [59] used
SVM as a classifier to detect DDoS attacks. They found that their algorithm is better than
other machine learning algorithms. However, their algorithm could only detect attacks
without trying to mitigate these attacks [12].
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGIES
This chapter explains flow classifications in the first part. In the second part, it
depicts algorithms that are used to identify the compromised switch interfaces and detect
DDoS attacks against the controller in the SDN. Sequential probability ratio test (SPRT),
count-based detection (CD), percentage-based detection (PD), entropy-based detection
(ED), and cumulative sum (CUSUM) are these algorithms.
3.1 Flow Classification
Flows are sequence of packets that share same characteristics. These characteristics
could be (source IP address, destination IP address, source port number, destination port
number, and/or protocol type). All of these information can be extracted from header of
each packet. Flows of TCP and UDP based protocols might be these five tuples. However,
flows of ICMP protocol could be grouping all packets that have same source IP address,
destination IP address, and protocol type because ICMP packets do not have port numbers
in their header.

Figure 3.1 Flow Sample from Wireshark about Flow [17]
For example, (172.16.116.194: 6222 -> 209.185.250.103: 80 TCP) is a TCP flow
sample from dataset that is called “outside tcpdump data” that was captured on the 5th day
of April in 1999 [17]. This flow has (9) packets which is simply explained steps of connect31

ion between two nodes. All of these packets share common information such as protocol
name, IP source address, IP destination address, destination port number, and source port
number. The first three packets are [SYN], [SYN/ACK], and [ACK] which are the threeway handshaking in TCP to start connection. The fourth and fifth packets are exchanging
information. The last four packets are responsible to close the connection.
In SDN architecture, each switch has flow table that contains multiple flows entry.
Each entry has rule so that switch can know how to handle each incoming packet. When
users tried to communicate with others, they send packets to its switch. These incoming
packets are grouped to form flows. The incoming flows look at flow table in switch to find
a match. If there are a match between incoming flow and flow entry, incoming flow will
follow rule associated with flow entry. However, if there are no match, then a switch may
generate packet-in message toward the controller to get new flow rule. Finally, the
controller installs new flow rule in flow table so that switch can handle a flow [24], [19].
However, attackers could be located in any computer device as shown in figure 2.6.
They tend to send to their switch large number of new low-traffic flows that are not
presented in that switch flow table. The new flows will induce switch to generate many
packet-in messages toward the controller. This overloads the controller with large number
of requests and leads to the DDoS attacks. Attackers also tend to send low-traffic flows
because these flows will save attackers’ time to congest the controller [6].
The main aim of classification is to identify DDoS attacks by classifying these
flows to either low-traffic flows (malicious flows) or normal flows. Let consider (Foi ),
where (o) is a sequence observations of different flows (F) that injected an interface (i) of
the SDN switch. (Foi ) is low flow if total number of packets within this flow is lower than
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or equal to certain threshold. However, (Foi ) is normal flow if total number of packets within
this flow is larger than that threshold. The (Foi ) can be defined as follow [6]:
(Foi )= {

1, if number of packets≤Threshold
0, if number of packets>Threshold

(3.1)

3.2 Detection Algorithms
The main goal for this stage is to identify the affected interface. Five different type
of algorithms that were used to decide whether switch interface (i) is compromised or not.
3.2.1 Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)
SPRT is the first algorithm that was developed by Wald, and it is a
specific sequential hypothesis test based on mathematical calculation [61]. It uses two
hypothesizes which are H0 and H1. H0 means that interface is normal whereas H1 means
that interface of switch is compromised. The compromised interface (H1) is injected by
large number of low-traffic flows whereas normal interface is injected by large number of
normal flows.
In reality, detection process produces two types of error which are false positive
and false negative. False positive error is benign interfaces (H0) that are falsely identified
as compromised interfaces (H1). False negative error is the compromised interfaces (H1)
that are falsely identified as benign interfaces (H0). To avoid these two types of errors,
value of false positive error should not exceed a specified value of (α), and value of false
negative error should not exceed a specified value of (β).
In [6], SPRT was used to decide whether the interface (i) is compromised or not by
considering a sequence of (n) which is observation of normal and compromise flows (Foi )
where (o) is the series of observation (o=1,2,3,…,n). These sequences of flows observation
are obtained from the first stage which is flow classification. According to SPRT method,
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(Din ) is a detection function that can be defined as a log-likelihood ratio of (n) flows
observation, whether they are normal flow or low-traffic flow, for certain interface (i).
Therefore,

the

equation
Din =

ln

for

(

Din

)

is

the

pr (Fi1 ,…., Fin |H1 )
pr ( Fi1 , …. , Fin |H0 )

following

[6]:
(3.2)

Assuming (Foi ) is identically distributed and independent [6], Thus, Din will be:
n

Din = ∑ ln
o=1

pr (Foi |H1 )

(3.3)

pr ( Fio |H0 )

Because Fio is a Bernoulli random variable [6],
pr ( Foi =1|H0 ) = 1- pr ( Fio =0|H0 )=λ0

(3.4)

pr ( Fio =1|H1 ) =1-pr ( Fio =0|H1 )=λ1

(3.5)

Where λ0 is less than λ1 because normal interface is less likely to be injected with
low-traffic flows.
This detection can be a one-dimensional random walk. This means if Coi which is
total number of packets of Foi are less than or equal to certain threshold (which is 3) then
(Foi )=1 and the walk moves upward one step. However, if Coi are larger than the threshold
then (Foi )=0 and the walk moves downward one step [6]. Therefore, the new equation for
Din will be:
Din-1 +ln
Din =
{

pr (Foi =1|H1 )
pr ( Fio =1 |H0 )

pr
Din-1 +ln

(Fio =0|H1 )

pr ( Fio =0 |H0 )
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, Coi ≤threshold
, Coi >threshold

λ1 i
, C ≤threshold
λ0 o
=
1-λ1 i
Din-1 +ln
, C >threshold
{
1-λ0 o
Din-1 +ln

(3.6)

Where Di0 =1.
Now, the value of Din compares each time with the upper threshold (A) and lower
threshold (B). If value of Din is smaller or equal to (B), then the interface (i) is H0 and
terminate the test. If value of Din is larger or equal to (A), then the interface (i) is H1 and
terminate test. Otherwise, monitor will continue with additional observation. The value of
(A) and (B) can be calculated as shown in equation (3.7) [6], [61]:
β
(1-α)
(1-β)
{ B=ln α
A=ln

(3.7)

3.2.2 Count-Based Detection (CD)
CD is another approach that is used to identify DDoS attacks and locate the
compromised interface. This method is based on the number of low-traffic flows. The result
of first step that is explained in (3.1) which is classifying flows to either low-traffic flows
or normal flows are used as an input to this method. In this method, normal flows are
ignored, and low-traffic flows are gathered into small groups or window size based on
either timeslot or number of packets. Number of low-traffic flows are calculated per group,
and the result is compared with certain threshold. If comparison result is larger or equal to
threshold, then attack is detected. However, there is no attack if result of comparison is
lower than threshold. Finally, comparison process will go through all groups to decide
whether certain interface is infected or not [6].
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3.2.3 Percentage-Based Detection (PD)
PD is another method that is also used to detect DDoS attacks against the controller.
It also uses to determine whether interface is compromise or not. This method is based on
finding percentage of low-traffic flows. This method has two main components which are
windows size and threshold. First, the results of low-traffic flows classification from the
first stage are grouped to small groups size based on either number of packets or timeslots.
Second, percentages of low-traffic flows are calculated by dividing number of low-traffic
flows values over number of all flows (normal and low-traffic flows) per group. Third, the
results from each group is compared with certain threshold. If percentage of low-traffic
flows for one group is larger or equal to a suggested threshold, there is attack for this group.
However, if the result of comparison is lower than the threshold, then there is no attack.
The process will go through all small groups to find whether the interface is compromise
or not [6].
3.2.4 Entropy-Based Detection (ED)
Seyed and Marc proposed a detection method in [11] that is based on calculating
incoming packets’ entropy that is used to measure the randomness of these packets. When
incoming packets are random, the entropy may be high. However, when the randomness is
low, the entropy may be also low. This method has two main parts which are windows size
and threshold. Incoming packets need to be divided into small groups (windows) based on
either timeslot or number of incoming packets. Entropy is calculated for all elements in
each window. The value of entropy of each window compares with certain threshold to
measure randomness.
In this method, packets are classified to different flows according to certain
common of specification such as IP source address, IP destination address, port source
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number, port destination number, and protocol type as mentioned earlier in flow
classification section. Then, destination IP address for the first packet of each unique flow
should be monitored. These monitored IP destination addresses are grouped in windows
(W). For each window, hash table of two column is created. The first column contains all
unique IP destination addresses, and second column contains number of times that each
unique IP appeared as shown in following equation:
W= {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, yi), ….}

(3.8)

Let say (i) is denoting for each unique element in the window, and (n) is the total
number of all IP destination addresses for each window (W). Then, probability (P) of each
unique IP destination address is calculated as shown in following equation:
pi =

yi
n

(3.9)

Entropy (E) for each window can be calculated in equation (3.10). Then, the value
of entropy may compare with certain threshold. if value of entropy is larger than the
threshold, this means there are no attacks. However, if value of entropy is smaller than the
threshold, this means there are attacks.
n

E= - ∑ pi ln pi

(3.10)

i=1

3.2.5 Cumulative Sum Detection (CUSUM)
CUSUM is an approach that is used to identify whether there is a small shift in the
process mean from certain target or not. It is a sequential analysis method that is introduced
by Page in [62]. CUSUM is the sum of accumulative samples that are deviated from target
(M0). If the results of summation are under certain threshold that is called decision interval
(H), this means the operation of process is normal and within the target. However, if the
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result of accumulative sum is equal or larger than decision interval (H), this means the
process is out-of-control.
After flows are classified to either low-traffic flows or normal flow in the first step,
percentages of low-traffic flows (Xi) are calculated by dividing number of low-traffic flows
over number of all flows (normal and low-traffic flows) per timeslot. Target mean (M0) is
calculated by averaging all percentage values (dividing a summation of all percentage of
low-traffic flows values by their number). The accumulative deviation, which is the
summation of changes, can be calculated in two side. Upper side CUSUM ( C+i ) is
calculated when there are change in the upper or positive side whereas lower side CUSUM
(C-i ) is calculated when there are change in lower or negative side. The upper and lower
side CUSUM are computed as follow [62], [63]:
(C+i ) = Max [ 0, (C+i-1 ) +Xi- M0-K]

(3.11)

(C-i ) = Min [ 0, (C-i-1 ) +Xi- M0+K]

(3.12)

Where C+0 and C-0 equal 0.
Allowance value or reference value which is (K) is chosen to be in middle of two
values. These two values are target mean (M0) and attack value of the mean (M1) that would
be detected fast. It can be computed as follow:
δ

K= 2 σ=

|M1 -M0 |
2

(3.13)

Where (σ) is the standard deviation that calculated based on target mean (M0)
whereas (δ) is computed as follow:
δ=

|M1 -M0 |
σ
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(3.14)

If the value of upper side CUSUM (C+i ) and lower side CUSUM (C-i ) is larger than
certain threshold (H), this means attack is detected. The value of (H) that suggested in [62]
and [64] computed as follow:
H= d k

(3.15)

Where (d) is a function of false positive error (α), which is benign activities that are
falsely identify as attack or shift in process, and false negative error (β), which is amount
of shift or attacks that are falsely identified as benign. It is computed as follow:
d=

2
δ2

1-β

ln ( α )

(3.16)

CUSUM method uses two counters which are (N+ ) and (N- ) for (C+i ) and (C-i )
respectively to record when these two values start to increase above target mean (M0). (N+ )
and (N- ) increases by one when value of (C+i ) and (C-i ) shifts away from target mean. The
reason for that is to know when attacks start to occur exactly by counting backward from
the time that (C+i ) and (C-i ) values has exceeded (H) to time that these values start to shift
from (M0).
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS, EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Overview
This chapter presents the results of flow classification and detection algorithms that
are explained in the previous section. Java is the programming language that is used to
implement these algorithms. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
datasets are used to evaluate our works.
4.2 Datasets
The datasets that are available in the Lincoln Laboratory website [17] is used to
evaluate the detection algorithms. These datasets were captured by the group of Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to evaluate computer network instruction
detection systems. Some of these datasets were captured during 1998 while others were
captured during 1999. The datasets that were captured during 1998 have one router that
has one interface which is “00:00:0C:04:41:BC”. However, the datasets that were captured
during 1999 have one router that has one interface which is “00:10:7B:38:46:32”. All main
communications were passing through this interface. These two interfaces are considered
as SDN switch interface in our case. These interfaces generated packet-in messages toward
controller to overload it if they receive new flows from other interfaces that are connected
to them. Therefore, we filtered out communication among other interfaces because they do
not generate packet-in messages.
Four of these datasets were picked to do our evaluation, and they have the same
name which is (outside tcpdump data). To recognize among them, we depended on dates
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of capturing these datasets. Therefore, datasets that were used in our evaluation are
(04/05/1999), (03/11/1999), (03/12/1999), and (07/03/1998).
4.3. Using Flows Classification in DARPA Dataset
We used jNetpcap library that is implemented in java to read packets from a dataset.
Packets were grouped to unique flows based on packet header information. Three multimap
tables of two columns and multiple rows were created to serve our needs. For the first
multimap table, first column stored all unique flows whereas second column stored all
packets that are belonged to each unique flow. As we mentioned earlier,
“00:00:0C:04:41:BC” is the only MAC address number for the SDN switch for datasets
that were captured during 1998. However, “00:10:7B:38:46:32” is the only MAC address
number for the SDN switch for datasets that were captured during 1999. From the first
multimap table, we need to get only flows that are injected to “00:00:0C:04:41:BC” if
dataset is chosen from 1998 and “00:10:7B:38:46:32” if dataset is chosen from 1999.
To do that, we checked whether first packet for each flow has this MAC address as
a destination address in their header or not. If this condition is yes, we created another
multimap table, and we saved these flows in first column and number of each unique flows
in the second column. However, we ignored the rest that do not have this condition. We
did that because we need to know who start the connection. If the destination address in
first packet is this MAC, we knew that switch interface is the receiver. Thus, if the receiver
receives low-traffic flows, then switch will generate packet-in toward controller.
Finally, we classified all flows that exist in the second map table to either normal
or low-traffic flows. We did that by comparing number of packets with certain threshold.
The threshold is chosen to be (3) because normal TCP flow has at least three packets which
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are three-ways handshaking of TCP protocol [6]. Therefore, if number of packets that
belong to certain flow is larger than or equal to (3), the flow is normal, otherwise it is lowtraffic flow. For example, the flow shown in figure 3.1 is normal flow because total number
of packets are more than (3) packets. This process was applied to all flows that exist in the
second multimap table. The results of classification were stored in the third multimap table.
4.4 Flow Classification Results
In this section, we picked four datasets to evaluate and present result of flow
classification. These datasets are (04/05/1999), (03/11/1999), (03/12/1999), and
(07/03/1998).
4.4.1 Results of Flows Classification for (04/05/1999) Dataset
This dataset contains (1299771) packets that have different protocols in their
header. There are many types of DDoS attacks that were detected at different times in this
dataset as mentioned in [6]. After gathering these packets to different flows, we got (51376)
flows. Only (25762) have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as destination in their first packet as shown
in figure (4.1). After classifying these flows, we got (20732) low-traffic flows and the rest
of them were normal as shown in table 3.
Dataset
name

Number of

Number Number of all flows that have

Number of low flows that have

Number of normal flows that

all packets

of all

00:10:7B:38:46:32 as

00:10:7B:38:46:32 as

have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as

destination in the first packet of

destination in the first packet of

destination in the first packet of

each flow

each flow

each flow

in each
dataset

Flows

04/05/1999

1299771

51376

25762

20732

5030

03/11/1999

1339058

56725

14840

11482

3358

03/12/1999

1176620

49050

18055

15248

2807

Table 3: Statistics of Classification Flows Phase for 1999 Datasets
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Vast number of low-traffic flows got generated at (9:43:11) as shown in figure
(4.2). Portsweep attack was the reason for that. This attack is one of the scanner method
that is used to probe the server ports to check which one is opened for the services.
Attackers send one FIN packet to server. Server replies with RST,ACK packet if the port
is closed, or it replies with ACK packet if port is opened [66].

All flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as destination in
the first packet of each flow on the 5th day of April
Total number of Flows

100000
10000
1000
100
10
8:09

10:33

12:57

15:21

17:45

20:09

Time Stamp

Figure 4.1 : All Flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as Destination Address in the First
Packet of each Flow on the 5th day of April Dataset
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18:07

17:33

16:59
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16:02

15:36

15:11

14:44

14:17

13:48

13:21

12:53

12:26

12:00

11:29

11:01

10:28

10:02

9:36

9:09

8:42

1

8:10

Low Flows or Attacks

100000

low flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as destination in
the first packet of each flow on the 5th day of April

Figure 4.2: Low-Traffic Flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as Destination Address in
the First Packet of each Flow on the 5th day of April Dataset
Even though intrusion detection methods do not consider portsweep as DDoS
attacks, but attackers can use it to generate many low-traffic flows to trigger SDN switch
to generate packet-in messages to overload the controller as stated in [6]. These types of
scanners can pass through packet routers filtering and some type of firewalls [67] and lead
to actual dangers in the future [68]. Thus, it is very important to consider them as an attack.
In addition, smurf attack that occurred at (13:18:12) also generated many lowtraffic flows as shown in figure (4.2). Smurf uses spoofed IP that is usually like victim
machine. Attackers may direct victim machine to send an ICMP protocol that contains echo
asking for a reply to its broadcast address of its network. When victim does that, these IP
addresses may reply with echo response that makes network unusable [69].
Finally, neptune attacks generated many low-traffic flows at (18:04:04) as shown
in figure (4.2). In neptune attack, attacker sends SYN packets from its IP address or spoofed
IP address to server to hide his identity. Then, server responses with a SYN/ACK packets
to client, while client will not send back ACK packet. In this case, server may wait some
time for each connection, and this consumes server resources and drops legitimate requests
[70].
4.4.2 Results of Flows Classification for (03/11/1999) Dataset
This dataset contains (1339058) packets that different protocols in their headers.
(56725) are the number of all flows after dividing these packets to unique flows as shown
in table 3. The number of all flows that have (00:10:7B:38:46:32) as a destination Address
in the First Packet of each Flow is (14840) as shown in figure (4.3).
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All flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as destination in
the first packet of each flow on the 11th day of March in
1999
Number of All Flows
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8:24

10:48

13:12

15:36

18:00
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Figure 4.3: All Flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as Destination Address in the First
Packet of each Flow on the 11th day of March in 1999 Dataset
Low Flows on the 11th day of March in 1999
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Figure 4.4: Low-Traffic Flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as Destination Address in
the First Packet of each Flow on the 11th day of March in 1999 Dataset
This dataset produces (11482) flows that have (00:10:7B:38:46:32) as a
destination Address in the First Packet of each Flow as in figure (4.4) . As stated in DARPA
website, various types of DDoS attacks were detected at different times for this dataset.
Portsweep generated many low-traffic flows attacks starting at (10:50:11). In addition,
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another attack which is neptune or SYN flood attack leaded also to produce vast low-traffic
flows at (11:04:16). Finally, at (16:36:10), ipsweep also generated many numbers of low
attacks. ipsweep is like a probe network technique. In the legitimate cases, admin of
network sends this probe to identify which machine is alive for the diagnosis purposes [68].
However, attackers can use this probe to serve its need. They can send to SDN switch large
amount of ICMP echo packets that lead to create a table miss. In turn, compromised switch
interface generates packet-in requests toward controller to overload it. This is kind of
DDoS attacks that overloads the controller and refuse legitimate requests.
4.4.3 Results of Flows Classification for (03/12/1999) Dataset
This dataset has almost (1176620) packets. When we classified these packets to
different flows, we got almost (49050) flows as shown in table 3. Because only flows that
are injected to SDN switch would overload controller, we filtered out other flows. Thus,
we got (18055) as total number of flows that are injected to SDN switch as shown in figure
4.5. These total number in figure 4.5 can be classified into (15248) as low-traffic flows and
rest of them as normal. In figure 4.6, there are many new low-traffic flows that were
generated at (11:20:15) which is a neptune attack. Finally, portsweep is another attack that
produced low-traffic flows at 17:13:10.
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All Flows on the 12th day of March in 1999
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Figure 4.5: All Flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as Destination Address in the First
Packet of each Flow on the 12th day of March in 1999 Dataset
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Figure 4.6: Low-Traffic Flows that have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as Destination Address in
the First Packet of each Flow on the 12th day of March in 1999 Dataset

4.4.4 Results of Flows Classification for (07/03/1998) Dataset
This dataset has almost one million packets as shown in table 4. These packets can
be grouped to (256055) flows. The datasets that were captured during 1998 has one router
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that has one interface which is “00:00:0C:04:41:BC”. Therefore, we need to get only these
flows that are injected to this interface, which is considered as SDN switch in our case. We
got (250551) flows that have this MAC address as destination in their first packet as shown
in figure (4.7).
Dataset
name

Number of all

Number

Number of all flows that have

Number of low flows that have

packets in each

of all

00:00:0C:04:41:BC as

00:00:0C:04:41:BC as

have 00:10:7B:38:46:32 as

destination in the first packet

destination in the first packet

destination in the first packet of

of each flow

of each flow

each flow

dataset
Flows

07/03/1998

1194920

256055

250551

243730

Number of normal flows that

6821

Table 4: Statistics of Classification Flows phase for 1998 Dataset
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Figure 4.7: All Flows that have 00:00:0C:04:41:BC as Destination Address in the First
Packet of each Flow for (07/03/1998) Dataset
There are many new low-traffic flows starting to occur at different time stamp for
this dataset as mentioned in DARPA website and shown in figure (4.8). First, portsweep
attack generated low flow starting at 11:46:39. Another attack which is neptune also
produced many new flows at 17:27:07. Finally, at 18:00:15, smurf attack has started to
occur as shown in figure below.
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Low Flows for (07/03/1998)
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Figure 4.8: Low-Traffic Flows that have 00:00:0C:04:41:BC as Destination Address in
the First Packet of each Flow for (07/03/1998) Dataset
4.5 Parameters of Detection Methods
First of all, SPRT needs four parameters in its algorithms as mentioned in section
(3.2.1). These parameters are β, α, λ0 and λ1. It is better to choose a small value of β and α
that are between 0.01 and 0.05 to limit the value of false negative error and false positive
error as mentioned in [6] and [65]. As a result, we set β to be equal to (0.02) and α to (0.01).
We also set λ0= 0.33 and λ1=0.6 because choosing these two values decreases the number
of low-traffic flows observations that are needed to decide whether interface is
compromised or not as mentioned in [6].
In addition, CD, PD, ED, and CUSUM depend on two important components which
are windows size and threshold. First, window size for CD, PD and CUSUM methods are
based on timeslot. We set their window size to be either almost every five minutes or ten
minutes. However, window size for ED method is based on packets number. As suggested
in [11] , number of packets in windows size should be set to be same as number of hosts in
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the network. Thus, we set that to be 10 packets because number of hosts in the network of
dataset is almost 10.
Second, we chose different threshold values which are 80, 150, and 250 in CD
method. However, threshold value of PD was set to the following values: 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8.
The reason for choosing different values is to observe reaction of each method with
different threshold. However, the threshold of ED should set to be either 1.31 or 0.2 as
suggested in [11] and [6]. Finally, M1 or threshold of CUSUM algorithm was set to be
either 0.4 or 0.8. We chose 0.4 because we need to detect out-of-control or low-traffic flows
average value quickly. We also assumed M1 to be 0.8 to compare results with previous
threshold.
4.6 Detection Methods Results and Discussion
This section presents and compares results of the detection algorithms. SPRT,
CD, PD, ED, and CUSUM are the detection algorithms that are used to show the results.
4.6.1 Results of Detection Algorithm for (04/05/1999) Dataset
On 5th of April 1999 dataset, three types of DDoS attacks named “portsweep”,
“smurf”, and “neptune” occurred at “9:43:11”, “13:18:12”, and “18:04:04” respectively.
All of these attacks produce vast and new of low-traffic flows as shown in figure (4.2).
Table.5 summarizes results of all detection methods for this dataset.

Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD

Detection
Window
size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold
80
150
250
80
150
250
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Detected Attacks (√)
Portsweep
Smurf
Neptune
√
√

√
√

√

√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√

PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8

√
√

√

√

√
√
√

√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

Table 5: Detected Attacks for All Detection Methods for (04/05/1999) Dataset
First of all, SPRT was able to detect all of these attacks. SPRT could decide that
switch interface is compromised after observing only six continuous low-traffic flows. It
also took only ten continuous normal flows observation to decide that interface is normal.
These numbers are considered to be as minimum number of observations that are needed
to take a decision.
In addition, CD generated same results when we chose different timeslot and
produced different results when we chose different threshold. When we set threshold=80,
CD detected all attacks that were detected by SPRT method. However, CD detected only
“neptune” attack when threshold= 150 or 250. This means CD method produces false
negative when threshold is high. Thus, it is a challenge to choose certain threshold and
windows size to detect all attacks in CD method.
Furthermore, PD also depends on windows size and threshold in its
implementation. First, PD was not able to identify “smurf” attack and produce false
negative when we set windows size to 5-minute and choose threshold=0.5. When we
changed that threshold to 0.8 with the same windows size, PD produced false negative at
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“9:43:11” and “13:18:12” respectively. However, when we modified threshold to 0.2 with
the same timeslot, PD method generated false positive at “12:15”. Second, when we set
timeslot to 10-minute with different threshold, we got different results. If threshold=0.2,
PD detected all attacks. When threshold was 0.5 or 0.8, PD detected only neptune attack.
Therefore, PD method has the same problem that is faced by CD method which is choosing
an appropriate threshold and window size to get good output.
Finally, ED method generated false positive at “10:29” and false negative at “9:43”
when windows size was 10 packets and threshold=1.31 or 0.2. CUSUM did not detect
portsweep attacks when M1 =0.8. It also identified “smurf” attack as a benign at “13:18”
whether M1=0.4 or 0.8. CUSUM faces difficulties of setting suitable windows size and
threshold value to get accurate results. Finally, we got different results from CD, PD, ED,
and CUSUM when we changed their main component values as shown results for 5th April
dataset. Thus, it is challenging to choose these values to get accurate results.
4.6.2 Results of Detection Algorithm for (03/11/1999) Dataset
On 11th of March in 1999 dataset, three types of DDoS attacks named “portsweep”,
“neptune”, and “ipsweep” occurred at “10:50:11”, “11:04:16”, and “16:36:10”
respectively. All of these attacks generate new and vast number of low-traffic flows as
shown in figure (4.4). Table.6 summarizes results of all detection methods for this dataset.

Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD

Detection
Window
size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold

Detected Attacks (√)
portsweep
neptune
ipsweep
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

80
150
250
80
150
250
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√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

√
√
√
√
√
√

0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

Table 6: Detected Attacks for All Detection Methods for (03/11/1999) Dataset
First of all, SPRT identified all of these anomalies. The minimum number of lowtraffic flows observations that were helped SPRT to decide that switch interface is
compromise was only “6” whereas the maximum number of low-traffic flows observations
was “20”. However, the minimum number of normal flows observations to decide that
switch interface is normal was “10” whereas the maximum number was “19”.
Moreover, we used two timeslot sizes which are 5-minutes and 10-minutes with
different thresholds to evaluate CD and PD method as mentioned earlier. CD generated
false negative at “16:36:10” when timeslot and threshold were 5 or 10-minutes and 250
packets respectively. Furthermore, PD detected all attacks with window size of 5-minutes
and all proposed threshold. However, it generated false negative at “16:38” when we set
timeslot to10-minute and threshold=0.8.
Finally, ED was not able to detect “portsweep” and “neptune” and generated false
negative at “10:50:11” and “11:04:16” with both threshold 1.31 and 0.2. CUSUM method
identified all attacks on the 11th day of March dataset.
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4.6.3 Results of Detection Algorithm for (03/12/1999) Dataset
On 12th day of March in 1999 dataset, two types of DDoS attacks named “neptune”
and “portsweep” occurred at “11:20:15” and “17:13:10” respectively. All of these attacks
generated new and vast numbers of low-traffic flows as shown in figure (4.6). Table.7
summarizes results of all detection methods for this dataset.

Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

Detection
Window
size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold

Detected Attacks (√)
Neptune
Portsweep
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

80
150
250
80
150
250
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

Table 7: Detected Attacks for All Detection Methods for (03/12/1999) Dataset
First of all, SPRT detected all of these attacks. SPRT decided that switch interface
was compromised after observing “6” low-traffic flows which is the minimum number of
low-traffic flows observation whereas the maximum number was 27. However, the
minimum number of normal flows that were required to decide that switch interface as a
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normal in this dataset was 10 whereas maximum number was 16. Finally, CD, PD, ED,
and CUSUM detected all attacks for this dataset as shown in table 7.
4.6.4 Results of Detection Algorithm for (07/03/1998) Dataset
For this dataset, there are three attacks which are “portsweep”, “neptune”, and
“smurf” that were started to occur at “11:46:39”, “17:27:07”, and “18:00:15” respectively
as shown in figure (4.8). Table.8 summarizes results of all detection methods for this
dataset. First of all, SPRT detected “neptune” and “smurf” attack because they were
generated many new low-traffic flows. SPRT can decide that interface is compromised
after observing 6 continuous low-traffic flows which are considered to be as a minimum
number of observations whereas the maximum number of observation was 62. However,
the minimum number of normal flows that are required to decide that switch interface is
normal in this dataset is 10 whereas maximum number is 40.

Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

Detection
Window
size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold

Detected Attacks (√)
portsweep
neptune
smurf
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

80
150
250
80
150
250
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8
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√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

Table 8: Detected Attacks for All Detection Methods for (07/03/1999) Dataset
On other hands, SPRT method was not able to detect “portsweep” attack although
this attack produced low-traffic flows. This attack produces one low-traffic flow that was
coming from a port which is 1234 toward a port from a group of 1-100 port every three
minutes. This is like a DoS attack when an attacker attacks multiple machines from single
machine. There are many flows were generated every three minutes, and most of them were
normal flows. SPRT was taking its decision based on these normal flows. Thus, SPRT
produces false negative and fails to detect attacks when low-traffic flows are distributed
over long time periods. Finally, CD, PD, ED, and CUSUM failed to detect “portsweep”
and generated false negative at “11:46:39”.
4.7 Evaluation of Detection Method by Confusion Matrix
We used confusion matrix that is mentioned in [71] to evaluate and compare all
detection method. This matrix depends on four main components which are True Negative
(TN), False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), and True positive (TP). From these
elements, many metrics can be computed. First of all, true positive rate (TPR) is the rate of
number of malicious activities that are truly classified by classifier method as malicious. It
also called sensitivity or recall, and it can be calculated from the following equation:
TPR=

TP
TP+FN

(4.1)

True negative rate (TNR) is the rate of number of benign activities that are truly
classified by classifier method as benign. It also called specificity, and it can be computed
from the following equation:
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TNR=

TN
TN+FP

(4.2)

False positive rate (FPR) is rate of number of benign activities that are falsely
classified as malicious activates. It also called fall-out, and it can be computed as in
equation (4.3). False negative rate (FNR) is the rate of malicious activities that are falsely
classified by classification stage as benign activities. It also called miss rate, and it can be
computed as in equation (4.4):

FPR=

FP
FP+TN

(4.3)

FNR=

FN
TP+FN

(4.4)

In addition, positive predictive value (PPV) is the probability of intrusion detection
that are truly predicted as attacks. It also called precision and can be calculated from
equation (4.5). Negative prediction value (NPV) is probability of benign flows that are
truly predicted by detection methods as benign. It can be computed as in (4.6).
TP
TP+FP

(4.5)

TN
FN+TN

(4.6)

PPV=
NPV=

False discovery rate (FDR) or probability of false alarm is the likelihood of benign
activities that are incorrectly predicted as attacks, and it computed as in equation (4.7).
False omission rate (FOR) is the rate of intrusion that are incorrectly predicted as benign
and it can be computed as in equation (4.8). When results of TPR, TNR, PPV, and NPV
for certain detection method are closed to 1 and results of FPR, FNR, FDR, and FOR is
closed to 0, this means this detection method is good.
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FP
TP+FP

(4.7)

FN
FN+TN

(4.8)

FDR=
FOR=

Finally, Accuracy of detection methods can be calculated as in equation (4.9).
Prevalence is another metric, and it measures number of attacks affecting particular
population of dataset. It can be computed as in (4.10). Because accuracy metric is not a
good method to assess the performance of classifier or detection test, F1 score can be used
as another metric to measure accuracy of detection. It is a harmonic average of recall and
precision, and it can be computed as in (4.11). It is between 0 and 1. When F1 score is 0,
performance of classifier is worst whereas when it is 1, performance of classifier is best.
Accuracy=

TP+TN
TP+TN+FN+FP

Prevalence=
F1 score= 2.

TP+FN
TP+TN+FN+FP
PPV+TPR
PPV+TPR

(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11)

4.7.1 Confusion Matrix Results for (04/05/1999) Dataset
Confusion matrix for this dataset was computed for all detection method to compare
between them. First of all, we calculated TPR, FPR, TNR, FNR, PPV, FDR, FOR, and
NPV for all detection methods. These values are between 0 and 1. The values of TPR,
TNR, PPV, and NPV for SPRT method are very closed to 1 and results of FPR, FNR, FOR,
and FDR for this detection method is very closed to 0 as shown in figure 4.9. This means
this detection method is good. ED method has almost same results. However, value of FPR
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is 0.35 and TNR is 0.64 for this method whether threshold was 1.31 or 0.2 as shown in
figure 4.9.a and figure 4.9.b respectively.
CD, PD, and CUSUM produced very low TPR and very high FNR as shown in
figure 4.9.a and figure 4.9.b respectively. CUSUM also produced 0.3 to 0.4 of FDR and
0.6 to 0.7 for PPV as shown in figure 4.9.c. Finally, we used abbreviation for all detection
methods as shown in table 9 to make figure 4.8, figure 4.9, and figure 4.10 more clear.

Abbreviation
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S

Name of Detection
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

Window size Threshold
5-minutes
80
5-minutes
150
5-minutes
250
10-minutes
80
10-minutes
150
10-minutes
250
5-minutes
0.2
5-minutes
0.5
5-minutes
0.8
10-minutes
0.2
10-minutes
0.5
10-minutes
0.8
10 packets
0.2
10 packets
1.31
5-minutes
0.4
5-minutes
0.8
5-minutes
0.4
5-minutes
0.8

Table 9: Abbreviation for All Detection Methods
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0.8
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1

N,O
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1
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0
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Figure 4.9 Graph Showing (a) TPR vs. FPR, (b) TNR vs. FNR, (c) PPV vs. FDP, (d)
FOR vs. NPV for All Detection Methods for (04/05/1999) Dataset
Finally, values of prevalence, accuracy, and F1 score were presented in table 10.
The value of prevalence for both SPRT and ED were the same which is 0.80 whereas the
values of the rest were between 0.09 to 0.34. The value of accuracy and F1 score were 99%
for SPRT which means it is a good detection method. ED had 92% of accuracy and 95%
of F score. However, values of these two metrices for CD and PD were different. For
example, value of accuracy of CD and PD was between 0.69 and 0.84 whereas value of F
score was low. Finally, accuracy for CUSUM was between 70% to 80% whereas F score
was between 0.23 to 0.29.
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Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

Detection
Window
size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold

Prevalence

Accuracy

F1 score

80
150
250
80
150
250
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8

0.80
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.80
0.80
0.19
0.19
0.34
0.34

0.99
0.84
0.82
0.82
0.72
0.69
0.69
0.85
0.83
0.82
0.72
0.69
0.69
0.92
0.92
0.82
0.81
0.7
0.7

0.99
0.32
0.17
0.17
0.34
0.19
0.19
0.38
0.25
0.17
0.34
0.19
0.19
0.95
0.95
0.29
0.23
0.27
0.27

Table 10: Value of Prevalence, Accuracy, and F1 for All Detection Methods for
(04/05/1999) Dataset

4.7.2 Confusion Matrix Results for (03/11/1999) Dataset
The values of TPR, FPR, TNR, FNR, PPV, FDR, FOR, and NPV were calculated
for all detection method for this dataset as shown in figure (4.10). First of all, SPRT
produced high values of TPR, TNR, PPV, and NPV whereas it generated low values of
FPR, FNR, FOR, and FDR. This is an indication that this detection method is good.
However, ED has same results of SPRT, except that it produced high value of FOR and
NPV as shown in figure 4.10.d.
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Figure 4.10 Graph Showing (a) TPR vs. FPR, (b) TNR vs. FNR, (c) PPV vs. FDP,
(d) FOR vs. NPV for All Detection Methods for (03/11/1999) Dataset
Moreover, values of TPR for these PD, CD, CUSUM methods were almost between
0.2 to 0.4 as shown in figure 4.10.a whereas their values of FNR were between 0.53 to 0.8
as shown in figure 4.10.b. Finally, CUSUM generated low value of PPV and high value of
FDR when threshold = 0.4 and window size = 5-minutes as shown in figure 4.10.c.
Finally, SPRT had 99% of accuracy and F score whereas ED has 81% and 86% for
accuracy and of F score respectively as shown in table 11. On other hands, CD, PD, and
CUSUM had accuracy between 82% and 93%, but the values of F score are between 33%
and 63% which explains why these methods did not detect some DDoS attacks.
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Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

Detection
Window
size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold

Prevalence

Accuracy

F1 score

80
150
250
80
150
250
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8

0.77
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.77
0.77
0.11
0.11
0.17
0.17

0.99
0.93
0.91
0.91
0.89
0.85
0.85
0.93
0.93
0.92
0.89
0.89
0.85
0.81
0.81
0.83
0.83
0.82
0.85

0.99
0.63
0.37
0.37
0.57
0.33
0.33
0.63
0.63
0.47
0.57
0.57
0.33
0.86
0.86
0.38
0.38
0.37
0.42

Table 11: Value of Prevalence, Accuracy, and F1 for All Detection Methods for
(03/11/1999) Dataset
4.7.3 Confusion Matrix Results for (03/12/1999) Dataset
SPRT generated high levels of specificity, sensitivity, precision, and NPV that are
near to 1. It also produced low levels of fall out, miss rate, probability of false alarm, and
FOR that are near to 0. This seems to be best case scenario that a good detection method
should produce as shown on figure 4.11. ED had almost same results, except that values of
specificity, NPV, and FOR is 0.88, 0.85, and 0.1 respectively as shown in figure 4.11.a and
figure 4.11.d.
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Figure 4.11 Graph Showing (a) TPR vs. FPR, (b) TNR vs. FNR, (c) PPV vs. FDP,
(d) FOR vs. NPV for All Detection Methods for (03/12/1999) Dataset
In addition, CD, PD, and CUSUM produced very bad sensitivity which is almost 0
instead of 1 as shown in figure 4.11.a. They also had value of miss rate close to 1 instead
of 0 as shown 4.11.b. CUSUM produced values between 02 to 0.4 of FOR. Finally, it
generated low level of PPV and high level of FDP as in 4.11.c.
Finally, table 12 shows results of prevalence, accuracy, and F1 score. First of all,
SPRT and ED produced good value of these metrices. In addition, PD, CD, and CUSUM
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had values of prevalence between 0.24 and 0.43. They also had bad results of F1 score
which are between 0.29 and 0.32, and their accuracies between 56% to 80%.

Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

Detection
Window size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold
80
150
250
80
150
250
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8

Prevalence
0.84
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.84
0.84
0.24
0.24
0.43
0.43

Accuracy
0.99
0.80
0.80
0.80
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.80
0.80
0.80
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.95
0.95
0.73
0.75
0.56
0.60

F1 score
0.99
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.97
0.97
0.33
0.27
0.20
0.27

Table 12: Value of Prevalence, Accuracy, and F1 for All Detection Methods for
(03/12/1999) Dataset

4.7.4 Confusion Matrix Results for (07/03/1998) Dataset
This dataset likes other previous datasets in which SPRT and ED had good results
of TPR, FPR, TNR, FNR, PPV, FDP, NPV, and FOR as shown in figure 4.12. The only
exception is that ED had 0.72 of NPV and 0.27 of FOR, but it is still better than other
detections methods.
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Figure 4.12 Graph Showing (a) TPR vs. FPR, (b) TNR vs. FNR, (c) PPV vs. FDP,
(d) FOR vs. NPV for All Detection Methods for (07/03/1998) Dataset
PD, CD, and CUSUM had low values of TPR and high value if FNR as shown in
figure 4.12.a and figure 4.12.b respectively. Finally, SPRT and ED had 99% of accuracy
and F1 score. PD, CD, and CUSUM had accuracies between 45% to 53% and F1 score
between 23% to 31%.
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Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

Detection
Window size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold
80
150
250
80
150
250
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8

Prevalence
0.97
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.97
0.97
0.56
0.56
0.6
0.6

Accuracy
0.99
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.98
0.98
0.49
0.49
0.45
0.47

F1 score
0.99
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.31
0.31
0.31
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.31
0.31
0.31
0.99
0.99
0.26
0.26
0.23
0.27

Table 13: Value of Prevalence, Accuracy, and F1 for All Detection Methods for
(07/03/1998) Dataset
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 Conclusion
The SDN makes networks design more flexible, cheaper, and programmable
because it separates the control plane from the data plane. The SDN gives administrators
of networks more flexibility to handle the whole network by using one device which is the
controller. Unfortunately, the controller of the SDN faces the dangers of DDoS attacks.
Attackers trigger their switches to generate large number of packet-in messages toward
controller when they send new and vast numbers of low-traffic flows to switches. This
leads to DDoS attacks against the SDN controller. DDoS attacks can reduce system
availability and bring the network down.
We conducted a comparative study of a set of methods for detecting the DDoS
attacks on the controller of SDN and identifying compromised switch interfaces. Because
attackers generated new and low-traffic flows, flows were classified to either low-traffic
flows or normal flows. Results of classification were as an input for detection methods.
These methods are SPRT, CD, PD, ED, and CUSUM. These methods are based on
statistical approaches. DARPA dataset were used to evaluate these methods. The datasets
that were used in our evaluation are (04/05/1999), (03/11/1999), (03/12/1999), and
(07/03/1998).
In addition, CD, PD, ED, and CUSUM have two main components: windows size
and threshold. These algorithms need to divide dataset to small window sizes that are based

68

on either timeslot or packets number. The window size of CD, PD, and CUSUM was based
on timeslot whereas window size for ED was based on number of packets. Table 14 shows
the overall mean of detected attacks for all detection methods. First of all, the overall mean
of detected attacks for SPRT was 0.91. Furthermore, the overall mean of detected attacks
for CD and PD fall between 0.66 and 0.91 whereas overall average of detected attacks for
CUSUM fall between 0.74 and 0.83. Finally, ED has 0.66 of overall average of detected
attacks.
Detection
Name
SPRT
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
PD
ED
ED
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM
CUSUM

Window
size
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes
10 packets
10 packets
5-minutes
5-minutes
10-minutes
10-minutes

Threshold

Overall
Mean

80
150
250
80
150
250
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.2
1.31
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.8

0.91
0.91
0.74
0.66
0.91
0.74
0.66
0.91
0.83
0.74
0.91
0.74
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.83
0.74
0.83
0.74

Table 14: Overall Mean of Detected Attacks for all Datasets
We found that SPRT had 99% of accuracy and F score which means it is good
detection method. Values of TPR, TNR, PPV, and NPV for all datasets were almost closed
to 1 whereas values of FPR, FNR, FOR, and FDR were almost closed 0. SPRT detected
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all attacks without producing false positive or false negative when sequence of continuous
low-traffic flows was generated for certain amount of time. However, SPRT produced
false negative and failed to detect attacks when low-traffic flows were distributed over
long time periods as shown on the 3th day of July in 1998 dataset.
ED produced different results for each dataset. It had accuracy values that fall
between 81% and 98% whereas F score values fall between 86% and 99%. This method
generated values of FOR that fall between 0 and 0.44 whereas values of FPR fall between
0 and 0.35. Values of FNR and FDR close to 0. However, values of TPR and PPV close
to 1. Finally, values of TNR fall between 1 and 0.64 whereas NPV values fall between 1
and 0.55. ED was not able to detect some DDoS attacks such as portsweep on the 5th day
of April in 1999 dataset, portsweep and neptune on the 11th day of March in 1999 dataset,
and portsweep for 3th day of July in 1998 dataset.
In addition, CD and PD methods produced low number of TPR and high number
of FNR. This decreases both of accuracy and F score values. The values of accuracy for
CD and PD fall between 50 and 93 whereas values of F score fall 29 and 63. Moreover,
CUSUM method has values of accuracy fall between 45 and 83 whereas values of F score
fall between 20 and 42. Finally, PD, CD, and CUSUM algorithms produced different
results when values of their components were changed. They are also failed to detect some
attacks. Therefore, it is challenging to set appropriate values of window size or threshold
to get accurate detection results.
5.2 Future Work
For future work, I am planning to study other new methods based on statistical
approaches to discover their effectiveness to detect the DDoS attacks and protect the
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controller of the SDN. I am also planning to explore the machine learning algorithms to
determine their ability in identifying the DDoS attacks against the controller of the SDN.
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